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 Debates surrounding the American healthcare system often try to address the coinciding 
issues of cost and access to the consumer. This can be attributed to the fact that the United States 
spends more than any other economically developed country on health care, both as a percentage 
of GDP and per capita, while having almost 29 million uninsured nonelderly citizens.1 Moreover, 
the United States spends more on health care than on any other sector of the economy, including 
defense, transportation, education, or housing.2 Although more spending is not facially 
problematic, our uninsured rate and adequate health outcomes prompt an important debate about 
why this country spends so much without better results. Unfortunately, the system functions as a 
complex web and has resulted in hamstrung consumers and a concentrated market of suppliers 
and third-party payers.  
 This is concerning for reasons other than the obvious fact that affordable health care is 
important to physical and psychological well-being of the country’s citizens. Our inefficient 
healthcare system has affected the general economic health of the nation. U.S. health care 
spending was $3.8 trillion in 2019, amounting to almost 18 percent of the nation’s gross 
domestic product.3 The more money that is tied up in the industry’s army of middlemen, the less 
there is available to be invested in economic growth for the public generally. Moreover, the 
financial health and stability of the Medicare Trust Fund is dire, given that it is projected to be 
depleted in 2026.4 Additionally, Social Security Trust Funds for old-age benefits and disability 
 
1 Barry R. Furrow, Et al., Health Law: Cases, Materials and Problems (8th edn, West Academic 2018).  
2 Id. 
3 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, National Health Expenditure Data , Historical, (Dec. 2020), 
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and 
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical  
4 Robert Pear, Medicare’s Trust Fund Is Set to Run Out in 8 Years. Social Security, 16., The New York Times (Jun. 
5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/05/us/politics/medicare-social-security-finances.html 
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insurance, taken together, could be depleted in 2034.5 Therefore, the financial viability of these 
safety net programs carries obvious macroeconomic importance.  
 Understanding the origins of these high costs has been one of consistent and rigorous 
study. This is because that generally, when patients are forced to pay more for health care, they 
are less likely to access treatment.6 This conundrum drives a reluctance of those patients to 
consume preventative treatments, which in turn enhances the seriousness of their health 
episodes.7 As health episodes become more dire, costs increase further because of the intensity of 
services provided.8 It is also important to define “costs” as they pertain to patients and providers. 
Costs to patients typically include premiums paid to insurers and out of pocket expenses paid to 
providers. Costs to providers are typically related to service and product operating expenses. 
 According to a study that analyzed the five most prevalent cost drivers for patients—
population growth, population aging, disease prevalence or incidence, service utilization, and 
service price and intensity—increases in health care prices have been more strongly associated 
with overall increases in health care spending than any other suggested factor.9 The study’s 
definition of “service price and intensity” depended upon the type of health care service 
provided. For example, for ambulatory, emergency department, and dental care, “service price 
and intensity” was defined as the mean spending per visit.10 For inpatient and nursing facility 
care, “service price and intensity” was the mean spending per bed-day.11 Lastly, for retail 
 
5 Id.  
6 Sara Heath, How Out-of-Pocket Costs Affect Patient Healthcare Access, Patient Engagement, (Jan. 11, 2017), 
https://patientengagementhit.com/news/how-out-of-pocket-costs-affect-patient-healthcare-access (“Research has 
shown a relationship between increasing patient cost burden and health service utilization, suggesting that when 
patients pay more for their healthcare, they are less likely to access treatment.”). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 






pharmaceuticals, “service price and intensity” was the mean spending per purchased 
prescription.12 The study, which analyzed US health care spending from 1996 to 2013, 
discovered that “price and intensity” alone accounted for more than 50% of the spending 
increase.13 Furthermore, the study concluded that the increase in prices were greatest in inpatient 
care.14 Therefore, although there are other factors that contribute to high spending, to improve 
the prevailing issues of cost and access to healthcare in the United States, policymakers, 
providers, and insurers must curtail prices of services delivered to patients. To curtail the prices 
of health care services, it is important to depict the structures of the system that are to blame for 
increases in prices. This paper argues in part that what has been called “the double-edged sword” 
of care integration and the market consolidation it causes ought to be considered the reason. 15 
 Since the 1990s, both market forces and policy actions have resulted in enhanced care 
coordination via vertical care integration. In health care, vertical integration refers to the 
consolidation of providers of different elements of health care services, such as hospitals and 
physicians, which collectively supply those elements of the health care service to the patient.16 
The presuppositions of vertical care integration are that it helps eliminate waste, encourage 
shared resources, and reduce overhead expenses.17 This is turn will reduce general health care 
costs and improve the experience for the consumer. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care 






15 Erin C. Fuse Brown & Jaime S. King, (2016) "The Double-Edged Sword of Health Care Integration:  
Consolidation and Cost Control," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 92 : Iss. 1 , Article 2. 56, 60 (2016)  
16 Id. at 62. 
17 Id. at 57. 
18 42 C.F.R. § 425.100 (2010) 
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 Unfortunately, these market trends and policy initiatives have realized unforeseen 
consequences for health care prices in America. Specifically, the heightened desire to pursue 
care coordination has coincided with a marketplace of providers and insurers that has 
concentrated in recent years. According to an aggregation of Kaufman Hall data, from 2000-
2009, there was an average of sixty hospital and health system mergers and acquisitions per 
year.19 From 2010-2019, that number increased to ninety-six average hospital and health system 
mergers per year.20 This report also highlighted the fact that mergers and acquisitions will 
continue to trend upward.21 Moreover, this trend in consolidation has also shifted from larger 
systems acquiring smaller organizations to larger systems merging. The average size of seller by 
annual revenue was below 2018’s record high of $409 million but remained above historical 
averages at $278 million.22 The average seller size by revenue has trended upward since 2009, 
from almost $150mm to over $350mm in 2018. 23 Although provider network executives have 
predicted that these consolidation trends would lead to better value for consumers, that value has 
yet to be realized. Unfortunately, as market concentration has proliferated, as has the buying 
power of provider networks, which has resulted in increased health care prices.24 
  This paper will further analyze these concentration trends and provide insight into 
proposals that seek to combat the double-edged sword of fragmentation and competition. The 
 
19 Revcycle Intelligence, How Hospital Merger and Acquisition Activity is Changing Healthcare , (Jul., 18, 2018), 
https://revcycleintelligence.com/features/how-hospital-merger-and-acquisition-activity-is-changing-healthcare 
20 Kaufman, Hall & Associates, LLC, 2019 M&A in Review: In Pursuit of the New Bases of Competition  (2020), 
https://www.kaufmanhall.com/sites/default/files/documents/2020-
01/2019_mergers_and_acquisitions_report_kaufmanhall.pdf, at 5. 
21 Id. at 13 (“Kaufman Hall expects many of the trends from 2019 to carry forward into 2020, including:  
Competition to control healthcare’s front door, new combinations across healthcare verticals, continued growth of 
regional health systems, and an emphasis on increased reach within existing markets.”). 
22 Id. at 5 
23 Id. at 7 
24 Eric T. Roberts, Michael E. Chernew, and J. Michael McWilliams, Market Share Matters: Evidence of Insurer 
and Provider Bargaining Over Prices, (Jan. 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2016.0479 
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paper will analyze some of the trends in consolidation, as well as a dive into the lack on anti-trust 
litigation that has failed to counteract it. The paper will argue in favor of policy pursuits that 
promote greater consumerism within the system, such as the Direct Primary Care model. These 
concepts can help manage prices, over-utilization, and expand greater access to American 
citizens. Additionally, this paper will also address counter arguments and proposals, and provide 
an argument as to why monopsony such as Medicare-for-All is an undesirable initiative for the 
U.S. to pursue.  
 Part I will further review policy trends of the past few decades that brought us to this 
conundrum of market consolidation and high prices. Part II will depict and analyze Senator 
Bernie Sanders Medicare for All proposal. It will also review President Biden’s proposed 
reforms to the healthcare system. Part III will summarize and detail Avik Roy and Dr. Ryan 
Neuhofel’s patient-centered proposals to fix health care.  
I. Understanding High Prices in Health Care and Their Prevailing Causes  
 As detailed above, prices of services provided has been the main driver of health care 
costs in America. This was detailed in a report that the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) conducted in 2014. According to the OECD’s report, among its 
developed member countries, the median hospital stay cost $10,530 and lasted almost eight days 
in 2014.25 In the United States, the average hospital stay cost $21,063, despite lasting only six 
days.26 Therefore, the average daily cost of a hospital stay in the U.S. was more than 2.5 times 
that of the OECD average of developed nations.27  
 







 Furthermore, the differences in prices vary depending on whether the payer is a public or 
private insurance plan. According to a 2015 study that researchers at the U.S. Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality conducted, hospitals were charging private insurers 106 percent 
of Medicare rates in 1996, but 175 percent of Medicare rates in 2012.28 Moreover, according to a 
2019 RAND Corporation study, test hospitals were 241 percent of Medicare prices in 2017.29 
This evidence implies that there are irregularities in the commercial payer market that are 
causing these high prices. 
a. How Health Care Prices are Negotiated and its Effect on Consumers   
 As stated above, the definition of health care “costs” often varies depending on whether 
they are in reference to the patient or the provider. Provider costs are typically related to service 
and product operating expenses, general overhead, and labor.30 As in other industries, prices are 
set to cover these costs, so the excess realized from services charged is what makes up a large 
portion of the provider’s revenue. Prices of health care services are determined during 
negotiations between providers and insurers.31 Because each price negotiation is individualized, 
what insurers agree to pay providers vary.32 Due to the historical practice of private negotiations, 
price agreements between providers and insurers are not transparent.33 Typically, then, neither 
providers or insurers can compare the market rate of health care services that their competitors 
are charging and paying.34 Most importantly, consumers (and often their employers) are unable 
 
28 Thomas M. Selden, Et al., The Growing Difference Between Public and Private Payment Rates for Inpatient 
Hospital Care, Health Affairs (Dec. 2015), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2015.0706 
29 Chapin White and Christopher Whaley, Prices Paid to Hospitals by Private Health Plans Are High Relative to 
Medicare and Vary Widely, RAND Corporation (2019), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3033.html. 
30 Barry R. Furrow, Et al., Health Law: Cases, Materials and Problems (8th edn, West Academic 2018). 
31 See Roberts, Chernew, McWilliams, supra note 24. 





to ascertain what certain health care procedures will cost under the insurance plan that they have 
invested in. 35 
 Unfortunately for consumers, these private negotiations have led to egregious examples 
of anticompetitive practices that have left consumers worse off. For example, in 2018, the Wall 
Street Journal obtained hidden contracts between insurers and hospitals revealing that certain 
contracts prohibited insurers from allowing patients to visit less-expensive or higher-quality 
health care providers.36 These “anti-steering clauses” essentially helped hospital networks 
guarantee a certain amount of business through their contract with the insurer.37 The Journal’s 
findings also revealed that some networks prevented insurers from excluding some of the 
system’s hospitals from the insurer’s networks.38 Moreover, certain contract provisions allowed a 
hospital operator to block information from online shopping tools that insurers offer to 
beneficiaries to show a hospital’s prices.39 Other anti-consumer provisions included in the 
Journal’s findings included hospital charges called “facility fees.” These fees “are supposed to 
cover the extra costs associated with care given in a hospital setting, including regulatory and 
safety standards that apply to hospitals.”40  
 Although one may assume that the manner of negotiations between providers and 
insurers would have a net negative effect on competing insurers and providers, that is not exactly 
what has happened. As providers have been incentivized through market forces and government 
policy to consolidate, insurers have felt the need to increase their bargaining power as well. 41 
 
35 Id. 
36 Anne Wilde Mathews, Behind Your Rising Health-Care Bills: Secret Hospital Deals That Squelch Competition , 






41 See Roberts, Chernew, and McWilliams, supra note 24. 
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Economic science would suggest that this could allow those insurers to negotiate lower prices, 
due to an expanded beneficiary pool. But, as both markets have centralized, there is concern that 
the relationship between the parties has become one of negotiating shared interests, instead of 
competitive prices for consumers.42 This creates a scenario where providers and insurers are 
negotiating for their sustained profitability, which in turn ignores beneficiaries. The ACA’s 
medical-loss ratio provision, which requires insurers to spend approximately 80 percent of 
premium dollars on medical care and health care quality improvement, took aim at this issue.43 A 
2017 study that examined differences in negotiated rates for office-based physician services, 
based on differences in the ability to bargain over prices, provides insights into this matter.44  
 The study found that differences in providers’ and insurers’ bargaining power are a 
distinct contributor to variation in commercial health care prices.45 “We estimated that—within 
the same provider groups—insurers with market shares of 15 percent or more …  negotiated 
prices for office visits that were 21 percent lower than prices negotiated by insurers with shares 
of less than 5 percent.”46 Additionally, analyses of provider network market share suggested that 
insurers require greater market shares to negotiate lower prices from large provider groups than 
they do when negotiating with smaller provider groups: “Office visit prices for small practices 
were $88, $72, and $70, for insurers with market shares of <5 percent, ≥5 to <15 percent, and 
≥15 percent, respectively, whereas prices for large provider groups were $97, $86, and $76, 
exhibiting a continued decrease across higher insurer-market-share categories.”47  
 
42 Thomas L. Greaney, The State of Competition in the Health Care Marketplace: The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act’s Impact on Competition , Prepared Statement Before the Committee on the Judiciary United 
States House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law (Sep. 10, 
2015), https://republicans-judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Greaney-Testimony.pdf. 
43 Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395w–27(e)(4) (2010) 






 Although insurers with large market shares can negotiate lower prices, the authors of the 
study suggest that greater consolidation of the commercial health insurance marketplace is not 
necessarily the solution.48 The study suggests, as this paper will argue, that enhanced antitrust 
enforcement into heavily concentrated providers and insurers is a necessary remedy. Most 
notably, the authors are uncertain as to whether customers of larger insurers are realizing the 
benefits of these insurers’ ability to negotiate prices.49 According to the authors of the study, 
more time, data, and research are needed to properly ascertain the effectiveness of the ACA’s 
medical-loss ratio provision. 50 
b. Integration in Name, Consolidation in Practice 
 Before the 1990s, the U.S. health care and insurance system had pursued policies and 
market concepts of what is referred to as horizontal integration. Horizontal integration is the 
concept of organizations acquiring or integrating with other organizations that provide the same 
or similar services such as multispecialty practice organizations.51 Since the 1990s, in attempts to 
lessen the fragmentation effects that horizontal integration had on the system, U.S. providers 
moved towards a system that promoted vertical integration.52 As described above, in practice, 
vertical integration is when organizations acquire or integrate with other organizations offering 
different levels of care, services, or functions such as hospital ownership of physician practices.53 
 
48 Id. (“Insurer consolidation could prompt additional provider mergers, whose countervailing effects on price 
negotiations might not ultimately lead to a net decline in prices.”) 
49 Id. (“It is not clear that the lower prices negotiated by large insurers are shared with consumers in the form of 
lower premiums or more generous benefits.”) 
50 Id. (“Since much of the research on insurance market structure and premiums is based on data predating the ACA, 
and in light of the current political uncertainty surrounding the ACA, it is not clear whether this provision will 
ultimately be effective in ensuring that insurers’ savings from lower negotiated prices are passed on to consumers.”) 
51 Jessica Heeringa, et al., Horizontal and Vertical Integration of Health Care Providers: A Framework for 
Understanding Various Provider Organizational Structures (Jan. 20, 2020), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6978994/#:~:text=Between%20the%201980s%20and%20mid,as%
20multihospital%20systems%20or%20multispecialty 
52 See Brown & King, supra note 15, at 70-71. 
53 See Brown & King, supra note 15, at 61. 
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An example of vertical integration would be a hospital buying a physician group or a health 
system that forms a drug company. Streamlining providers via vertical integration can help 
eliminate wasteful or repetitive services, encourage shared resources, and reduce overhead 
expenses.54 For example, consolidated hospital and physician efforts in the supply chain can 
align financial incentives between hospitals and referring physicians, reduce over-utilization, and 
provide centralized administrative services.55 Additionally, vertical integration of providers or 
insurers into integrated delivery systems may reduce the costs of complex negotiations between 
these parties.56  
 Unfortunately, initial concepts of vertical integration failed to foresee and mitigate the 
effects of over-utilization in the system.57 This issue of over-utilization, particularly in expensive 
regions on the country, became apparent to policy makers during the Obama Administration.58 In 
2009, physician and journalist Atul Gawande discovered that in spending regions of the country 
where health care spending was unusually high, the issue was not poorer health populations.59 He 
found that physicians and specialists were prescribing procedures that were unnecessary and 
economically inefficient.60 Gawande’s research provided a detailed synopsis as to how providers 
can exploit the fee-for-service payment model (FFS) to their benefit.61 At the time, Peter Orszag, 
President Obama’s budget director, cited Gawande’s research and estimated that “the federal 
government could have eliminated nearly 30% of Medicare spending without sacrificing quality 
of outcomes if higher-spending regions mirrored utilization patterns of lower-spending 
 
54 See Brown & King, supra note 15, at 61. 
55 See Brown & King, supra note 15, at 62. 
56 See Brown & King, supra note 15, at 62. 
57 Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, The New Yorker (Jun. 1, 2009), http://www 
.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/06/01/the-cost-conundrum [https://perma.cc/5JHY-4WV4]. 
58 See Brown & King, supra note 15, at 57. 





regions.”62 This research led several leading health economists to argue that to decrease costs, 
the U.S. health care system needed to reform its payment and delivery systems to disincentivize 
and reduce overutilization, and to instead reward coordination, quality, and efficiency.63 This 
resulted in ACA provisions such as the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP), the Hospital 
Value-Based Purchasing Program, and the National Pilot Program on Bundling.64 Specifically, 
the MSSP attempted to reform the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) payment 
system away from one that incentivized volume care to quality care.65 The program has 
encouraged providers to formulate Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), which were 
proposed to promote care coordination to reduce unnecessary medical care and improve health 
outcomes, while reducing utilization of critical care services.66 Although the verbiage of the 
MSSP incentivizes providers to formulate ACOs for Medicare beneficiaries, the intent was that 
private insurers would pursue the concept as well.67 
 ACOs are provider-based networks that consist of primary care physicians, hospitals, 
specialists, nursing homes, and other health care facilities that utilize data analytics and 
community management strategies to achieve cost efficiency and care quality.68 Under the 
MSSP, CMS rewards successful providers in ACOs a portion of the savings they achieve for 
their payers for balancing spending and quality.69 This complements the traditional fee-for-
 
62 Id.; see also Brown & King, supra note 15, at 57. 
63 See Brown & King, supra note 15, at 58.; see also Erin C. Fuse Brown, The Blind Spot in the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act’s Cost-Control Policies, 163 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 871 (2015). 
64 See Brown & King, supra note 15, at 63. 
65 See § 425.100(b), supra note 18. 
66 Id. 
67 See Brown & King, supra note 15, at 63. 
68 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Accountable Care Organizations (Mar. 4, 2021), 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ACO. 




service model.70 In short, ACOs reward value instead of volume, which is meant to address the 
issue of over-utilization.  
 Since the passage of the ACA, the growth of ACOs has been steady, with more than 100 
ACOs established nationwide at the end of 2011, to almost 1,000 by Q2 2019.71 From the end of 
Q2 2018 to the end of Q2 2019, three million people have been added to those who ACOs 
cover.72 At the end of Q2 2019, private insurers covered about 60 percent of ACO beneficiaries, 
while Medicare contracts covered approximately 30 percent and Medicaid covered 10 percent.73 
By the end of Q2 2019, there were 1,588 existing public and private ACO contracts, covering 
almost 44 million Americans.74 At the end of Q2 2019, ACOs cover less than five percent of the 
population in only six states.75  
 As stated previously, because of the misaligned incentives of the traditional FSS model, a 
distinctive characteristic of both public and private ACOs is their assumption of greater 
responsibility and financial risk for performance. Payment contracts are formulated in a way to 
bind ACOs with upside risks, downside risks, or both.76 During negotiations between networks 
and payers, the thresholds for rewards and risk are set.77 Downside risk models typically include 
the opportunity to accrue higher rates of shared savings.78 This makes it more attractive for 
 
70 Jesse Migneault, Understanding the Basics of Accountable Care Organizations, Healthpayer Intelligence (May 
23, 2017), https://healthpayerintelligence.com/news/understanding-the-basics-of-accountable-care-organizations, 
(“The fee-for-service model pays providers for each medically justifiable service they deliver, regardless of whether 
the service actively contributes to a  better health outcome.”). 
71 David Muhlestein, et al., Spread of ACOs And Value-Based Payment Models In 2019: Gauging the Impact of 






76 See Migneault, supra note 70. 
77 Id. (“While upside risk ACOs are not responsible to pay back any financial losses if they exceed the agreed -upon 
spending rates, ACOs participating in a downside risk arrangement will be asked to pay back part of the excess 




experienced providers to take on the additional financial risk and greater quality care 
responsibility.  
 Although value-based care agreements can vary on a case-by-case basis, the American 
Academy of Actuaries analyzed the five general payment structures of ACOs in a 2012 report. 
The first, the “one-sided” shared-savings agreement, is an upside risk contract in which providers 
are eligible to receive a portion of savings if they meet quality of care standards while providing 
care at lower-than-projected costs.79 The second, the “two-sided” shared-savings model, is one of 
dual sided risk, in which ACOs still would receive payment primarily on an FFS basis and would 
be eligible to receive a portion of the savings. They also would be at risk, however, for a portion 
of spending over the designated target.80 Next, the bundled/episode payment arrangement, is one 
in which provider organizations receive a lump sum payment for all the services a patient 
requires for an entire episode of care.81 Here, the ACO and its providers take on the downside 
risk pertaining to complications during the episode of care.82 Fourth, the partial capitation model, 
is an agreement in which providers receive a fixed dollar payment for specific services that 
patients may receive in a given time period.83 In partial capitation, the ACO is at risk for some of 
the services and care provided to patients.84 For example, the ACO may be at risk for hospital 
care but not physician services. Lastly, global payments, which incorporates a high-end of risk 
for the ACO, pays the network agreed upon monthly or annual payments regardless of services 
 
79 Mary Downs, et al., An Actuarial Perspective on Accountable Care Organizations, Academy of Actuaries (Dec. 








given or costs realized.85 The ACO bears the risk that payments received are insufficient to cover 
the costs of the services it provides.86  
 Unfortunately, although these payment structures have attempted to address the fleeting 
inefficiencies of traditional FFS, they have become another contributor to the market 
concentration problem. Because these payment models cause providers to endure heightened 
risk, they have added a consolidation incentive to improve profit margins.87 The trend will likely 
continue, as the proportion of ACOs taking on any downside risk is generally increasing across 
all ACO types and sizes.88 Moreover, 32 percent of physician led ACOs are participating in 
downside risk contracts, in comparison to 27 percent of hospital led ACOs.89 This is evidence 
that these contracts are becoming more accepted, due to the concerns that physician groups 
would be reluctant due to smaller financial reserves than hospital networks.90 This also helps 
explain why larger ACOs are more likely to participate in downside risk contracts than smaller 
ACOs.91 If smaller ACOs are to transition to downside risk contracts, it is likely that they will 
need greater incentives, or merge with existing networks.92  
c. Antitrust Enforcement has Proven to be Anti-Trustworthy  
 As market concentration has set root in the American healthcare industry, it is important 
to analyze the roll that the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
and states have (or have not) taken to address the issue. These government functionaries can act 












monopolistic behavior that hurts consumers and the healthcare system writ large. Unfortunately, 
according to antitrust experts, these law enforcement arms have pulled back from using these 
powers in recent years, which has helped enable the centralization of the U.S. healthcare system. 
Antitrust law expert Thomas Greaney has described antitrust enforcement in healthcare as a 
metaphorical absentee father.93 To understand the failures of antitrust enforcement in healthcare, 
it is important to understand laws that govern the issue and its related history in court.  
 There are a few broadly written laws that government can apply to introduce antitrust 
challenges to health care transactions and activity. Although these laws are applicable to most 
industries, they typically address the following types of antitrust violations related to healthcare 
industry transactions.94  
 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits agreements that “restrain trade or commerce.”95 
According to antitrust law expert Robert Leibenluft, the act of conspiring or contracting to create 
prima facie price-fixing mechanisms or market division is illegal.96 According to Leibenluft, 
these acts are illegal “even without evidence that the parties to the agreement have market power 
or that the agreements adversely affect competition.”97 Additionally, section 1 of the Sherman 
Act does not permit defenses that the contract provisions at issue create efficiencies that could 
counteract adverse competitive effects.98 However, according to Leibenluft, it is much more 
 
93 Thomas Greaney, Competition Policy after Health Care Reform: Mending Holes in Antitrust Law’s Protective 
Net, Duke University Press, Aug. 1, 2015, at 897. (“unchecked consolidation over the past fifteen years resulted in 
markets with dominant providers whose high prices became a  major driver of health cost inflation.”).  
94 Robert F. Leibenluft, Antitrust and Provider Collaborations: Where We’ve Been and What Should Be Done Now, 
Duke University Press, Aug. 2015, at 847.  
95 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890) 
96 See Leibenluft, supra note 94, at 847.  




difficult for a government agency to prevail in a rule of reason case than in one alleging per se 
antitrust violations.99  
 Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits any person who monopolizes, attempts to, or 
conspires to monopolize “any part of trade or commerce.”100 According to Leibenluft, to 
successfully apply this provision, the entity generally must “have a share in excess of 60–70 
percent in a market with significant entry barriers.”101 Another impediment to the application of 
this provision is the difficulty in defining what constitutes exclusionary conduct.102 According to 
Leibenluft, case law pertaining to what constitutes exclusionary conduct has been evolving and is 
vague, in part because “the courts are concerned about prohibiting dominant firms from engaging 
in conduct that restricts their ability to compete or achieve efficiencies.”103 In applying this 
provision, case law has attempted to distinguish between what constitutes behavior that is anti-
competitor, which is a fundamental of Capitalism, and behavior that is anti-competition, which is 
in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.104  
 Lastly, section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers or acquisitions that substantially 
infringe on competition.105 According to Leibenluft, in challenging such transactions, the 
plaintiff “must prove a case … that the transaction will result in adverse competitive effects in a 
properly defined relevant product and geographic market.”106 Like section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
 
99 Id. (“An agreement that involves prices or market allocations will be subject to the rule of reason … if the 
agreement is related to and reasonably necessary to a collaboration among the parties that has the potential to 
achieve cost savings or quality improvements.”) 
100 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1890) 
101 See Leibenluft, supra note 94, at 848. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1914) 
106 See Leibenluft, supra note 94, at 848. 
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applying this provision has proven to be particularly difficult, since large entities that merge or 
acquire are deft at detailing potential benefits to the consumer base such as quality control.107  
 Since 1980, the FTC and the DOJ pursued enforcement actions that involved both 
physicians and hospitals.108 Most of the enforcement actions pertaining to physicians involved 
those in an independent practice who had not financially integrated with one another but who 
had been accused of per se exclusionary conduct under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 109 These 
actions bore out of the 1982 Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical 
Society (MCMS). In MCMS, the defendant, a physician union, had established a set of maximum 
fees that member-doctors could accept as payment for medical services that were provided to 
patients.110 The defendant had to approve the insurance plans that patients were relying on to pay 
these fees.111 The Court held that a horizontal agreement between competitors which sets out a 
maximum price for goods or services undoubtedly would influence competitive pricing in the 
market.112 The Court rejected the defendant’s pro-competition argument, because the per se rule 
applied to any agreement calling for price fixing, regardless of any pro-competitive benefits that 
could result.113 This holding prohibited physicians from jointly negotiating with health plans 
unless the physicians had a shared financial risk agreement with the insurer. 114 
 This economic integration requirement led to an increase in physician and hospital 
mergers in the 1990s.115 As independent physicians needed to enhance their bargaining power 
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with insurers, there was an incentive to consolidate.116 This incentive only increased after the 
FTC and DOJ issued the revised Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care 
(1996) that reigned in the MCMS holding. The revision stated that “clinical integration” would 
be a permissible type of collaboration because of its potential to benefit consumers and therefore 
warranted rule of reason treatment.117 The agencies were reluctant to overreach and specifically 
defined “clinical integration” vaguely, due to their lack of knowledge of health care processes.118 
Despite industry-wide confusion for the next decade,119 the North Texas Specialty Physicians 
(NTSP) v. FTC case in 2008 provided clarity into how physician groups could properly integrate. 
In NTSP, the FTC had found that certain aspects of the defendant’s non-risk contract business, 
combined to result in horizontal price-fixing.120 The defendant in this case was a physician union 
that participated in both risk and non-risk contracts.121 The practices at issue included “the 
disclosure to all affiliated physicians … results of polls to determine the minimum rates 
physicians would accept … and NTSP's use of that minimum price when it negotiated with 
payors on behalf of physicians.”122 The court held that despite NTSP’s status as a “memberless” 
organization, a group of competitors controlled the organization, and was therefore considered to 
be a conspiracy of its members.123 Moreover, the court found that the different medical 
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specialties of board members were irrelevant,124 and that the proper analysis was whether 
members with “substantially similar economic interests” controlled the entity.125  
 As physician networks have consolidated, antitrust enforcement’s focus has been shifting 
to whether clinical integration has significant market power and is anticompetitive as reflected in 
a rule of reason analysis.126 Challenges recently have been related to physician practice mergers, 
which have successfully enjoined hospitals’ ability to consolidate with vastly undiversified 
specialty clinician groups such as cardiologists.127 As implied above, despite some successes, 
this analysis is difficult to apply, given the complex relationships between providers. 128 
 Antitrust action towards hospital mergers have had a similar record of volatility since the 
1990s. After initially winning several federal lawsuits in the 1980s and early 1990s, antitrust 
enforcers suffered seven losses in litigating hospital merger cases.129 According to Greaney, this 
led to a distinct, seven-year pullback in antitrust activity towards hospital mergers despite their 
accelerated growth during this time.130 As mergers went unabated, powerful hospital networks 
continued to expand their market share. According to a study, sixty-five percent of Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs) had highly concentrated hospital markets in 1990, and seventy-seven 
percent in 2006.131 In 2016, that number had reached ninety percent.132 Despite research that 
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suggests otherwise, the notion that vertical integration is pro-competition has contributed to this 
pullback in antitrust enforcement.133 Moreover, judicial mistakes pertaining to geographic market 
definitions enabled hospitals to consolidate.134  
 There is an adage that bad facts make bad law. This was the case in 1990, when the 
success of the government in hospital merger cases turned on the precedent set in U.S. v. 
Rockford Memorial Corp.  In Rockford, the issue of market definition turned on the results of a 
“patient flow analysis.”135 This analysis was based on a precedent case and a contrasting study 
pertaining to coal markets, which measured the extent of patient ingress and egress from a 
proposed geographic market.136 According to economists Dave Dranove and Andrew Sfekas, the 
concept behind the test was “if both flow statistics are small … the market is deemed to be well 
defined, based on the assumption that if few patients travel outside the proposed market for care, 
the area must not have many alternative providers.”137 The definition of “small” had varied  from 
ten to twenty-five percent.138 The Rockford court “limited the relevant geographic market to the 
county in which the merging hospitals operated, plus a set of zip codes from adjacent counties 
that contributed nontrivial numbers of patients to the Rockford area.”139 The result was that 
almost ninety percent of the defendant’s admissions resided in the defined market.140 Despite 
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there being four other hospitals in the defined market, the court held that the change in market 
consolidation was untenable.141  
 It is important to note that, according to Dranove and Sfekas, “The hospital mergers 
contested by the FTC and DOJ during the 1990s tended to involve smaller metropolitan areas 
with two to four hospitals that drew more than 10 percent of their patients from surrounding 
communities.”142  This is relevant because not all geographic areas are the same. What makes 
sense in rural areas is not necessarily the case in densely populated suburban regions. Antitrust 
suits that held similar holdings to Rockford included many hospitals far outside the metropolitan 
areas at issue, making it appear that the merging hospitals had not consolidated the market.143 
This enabled suburban and urban area hospital networks to merge without concern. For example, 
the courts permitted the merger of two Long Island hospitals based on the grounds that the 
patient-flow and geographic market analysis included much of New York City.144 According to 
Greaney, “courts were too easily persuaded to find overbroad geographic markets—which 
spurred others to undertake concentrative acquisitions and likely caused government prosecutors 
to forgo challenging hospital mergers for almost seven years.”145 The trends in consolidation, 
which are detailed above, support this conclusion.  
 The issues that antitrust enforcement have had in applying these laws, as implied above, 
are that most transactions that potentially infringe on competition are subject to much more 
extensive analysis. Since antitrust enforcement players have a burden to prove exclusionary 
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conduct, there are a litany of relevant factors that must be considered. These include product and 
geographic markets, transaction details such timeliness, efficiency assessment, and the overall 
effect the transaction will have on competition. 146 This can cause a strain on resources that may 
be outside the bounds of the government’s legal economy. Additionally, there are no special 
antitrust laws for the health care industry specifically. Leibenluft explained this dilemma: “Both 
the courts and the enforcers interpret the antitrust laws when applied to health care with the 
knowledge that they are bound by precedent—and that their actions may create precedent—in 
cases involving other industries.”147 Therefore, the uniqueness and complexity of the health care 
industry has disincentivized courts to pursue stricter holdings in cases relating to provider 
mergers. According to Leibenluft, it has also influenced law enforcement’s pursuit of antitrust 
claims: “The application of antitrust law to any particular set of circumstances is often a difficult  
task and is particularly so in the health care sector given the overlay of regulation, agency 
relationships, asymmetrical information, government payment, and other factors that result in 
various market failures.”148    
II. Addressing the Proposed Solutions to Health Care’s High Prices 
 Fortunately, despite the enduring nature of concentrated provider markets, solutions have 
been proposed to address them. Notably, Senator Bernie Sanders ran presidential campaigns in 
2016 and 2020 largely around his proposal to expand a revised version of Medicare to all 
American citizens. The Medicare of All Act of 2019, which is the version Senator Sanders last 
proposed, would largely do away with private insurance and consolidate almost all public plans 
into one.149 President Joe Biden ran his 2020 presidential campaign on a proposal, inter alia, that 
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would offer a public insurance option to Americans, while opting qualified citizens whose states 
have decided against Medicaid Expansion into the public option.150  
 Those on the other end of the political spectrum have proposed ideas that in practice take 
a more piecemeal approach to solving the issue of price and consolidation. Avik Roy, who is a 
former adviser to the Mitt Romney and Marco Rubio presidential campaigns151, has proposed a 
multi-pronged approach that includes further demands for transparent pricing, heightened 
antitrust enforcement, and regulatory reform.152 Moreover, Roy proposes Medicare Advantage 
for All, which would provide uninsured Americans sufficient subsidies on a sliding scale that 
would allow consumers to choose amongst existing Medicare Advantage plans.153 Ideally, these 
changes would lower barriers to entry for competitors and lower prices. Additionally, Dr. Ryan 
Neuhofel, has proposed decentralizing the management of health care dollars through a universal 
direct primary care model.154 The direct primary care model eliminates third parties and lets 
consumers purchase non-catastrophic services through their primary care physician.155  
a. Checking Quasi-Monopolies with a State-Sponsored Monopsony is Counterintuitive 
 The theory at the heart of both Biden and Sanders’ plans is twofold: use the state’s 
buying power to negotiate down prices and use monopsony purchasing to promote price 
uniformity. Under Sanders’s proposal, Medicare for All would in practice, be a single, national 
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health insurance program that would cover everyone living in the United States.156 The bill 
makes it unlawful for “any private insurer to sell health insurance coverage that duplicates the 
benefits provided under this Act.”157 The proposal eradicates copays and deductibles, except for 
prescription drugs, though the maximum cost would be $200 annually.158 This is a reform to 
traditional Medicare, which has no out-of-pocket limits and imposes high deductibles and 
copayments.159 Sanders’s egalitarian approach would likely simplify the point-of-care 
transactional process, because of consumers’ ability to utilize any providers’ services.160 
Additionally, the statute includes “a process for the automatic enrollment of individuals”161, 
which would, in theory, further simplify the health care purchasing process, as consumers would 
not have to consider the status of their private insurance plan.  
 Sanders’ state-sponsored insurance bill guarantees coverage of an array of potential 
health care needs including inpatient and outpatient hospital services, ambulatory patient 
services, primary and preventive services, prescription drugs, mental health and substance abuse 
treatment, laboratory and diagnostic services, comprehensive maternity and newborn care, 
pediatrics, dental and vision, and short-term rehabilitative and habilitative services and 
devices.162 The proposal also includes emergency services and necessary transportation for 
individuals with disabilities and of low-income.163 The Secretary of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) would be tasked with recommending reforms to the benefits package for lawmakers to 
consider.164  
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 Moreover, the bill would drastically alter the relationship between payer and provider. 
Under the proposal, the government would set service rates paid to doctors, hospitals, and 
pharmaceutical companies for services provided.165 These rates would be delivered in two annual 
lump-sum payments, which would cover the cost of operations and capital expenditures.166 
Instead of billing insurers, doctors would only need to send reimbursement invoices to the 
federal government. This would likely set lower payments to providers than currently realized 
with private insurance companies.167 Additionally, under the bill, patients would be permitted to 
contract with physicians outside the structure of the proposal.168 However, those providers who 
agree to private contracts with consumers will not be permitted to participate in the nationalized 
insurance plan for a year.169 This provision appears to be a hedge against fears that physicians 
will decide against contracting with the insurance plan.   
 Sanders’s plan, despite its political potency, is not likely to pass Congress, given its 
sweeping changes to an industry that employed over 20 million Americans in 2018.170 
Regardless of the bill’s likelihood to pass through Congress, the proposal is misguided for 
several reasons. The first is that quality could be affected if the budgeted amount allocated to the 
provider proves to be insufficient to cover its total costs. In case of a budget gap, the provider 
would be at-risk for the unpaid expenses, which would likely lead to dialed back services or cuts 
to necessary overhead. These issues have been realized recently in Britain and has led to 
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increased wait times for certain medical services.171 Rebuttals to these concerns will likely 
mention savings in administrative overhead, such as medical billing, as potential supplemental 
resources that providers could rely on to strengthen their bottom lines. However, there is no 
guarantee that those resources will be enough to cover a provider’s given costs. Moreover, the 
cost of taxation needed to establish the requisite bureaucracy could negate the expenses 
beneficiaries save in administrative overhead. This is the risk that comes with completely 
disassociating the provider from deciding the price of services.  
 Additionally, the bill will inevitably increase service demand at a time when those who 
provide the service are already being underpaid. According to a 2021 American Hospital 
Association (AHA) report, in 2019, hospitals incurred $56.8 billion in underpaid costs for 
delivering care to Medicare patients.172 Moreover, despite Medicare’s ability to control prices 
through government buying and regulatory power, the program has been less successful at 
controlling the volume of services it covers.173 This issue will only persist under Sanders’s plan, 
which, entails no cost-sharing mechanisms such as deductibles or co-payments174 but offers an 
incredibly generous benefit package to every American.175 These demand side mechanisms 
require patients to have skin-in-the-game and can provide a check on overutilization of services 
that patients request, and doctors recommend. According to Drew Altman, who heads the Kaiser 
Family Foundation, “no other developed nation has zero out of pocket costs.”176 Moreover, under 
the proposal, the government would further regulate the physician labor force and quantify the 
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need for specialists in areas of practice.177 Although this paper supports a heightened reliance on 
general practitioners, it remains to be seen how these regulations would affect the clinician labor 
market and the ability to supply medical services. It is likely that an increase in labor supply 
would be needed under this plan, given the increase in consumers178 and the plan’s extended 
benefits.179  
 Given its scope, it is difficult to grasp the effects of Sanders’s proposal in its entirety. The 
impetus behind this bill is the belief that health care is a right, but this is misguided. While rights 
are inalienable, services are not; they are not innovative, efficient, and present simply because a 
statute says they ought to be. Supply, demand, and behavioral science all affect the development 
and sustainability of an industry. To provide a metaphorical example, the City of Newark and the 
State of New Jersey combine to spend over $25,000 annually per pupil to graduate just sixty 
percent of their high school students.180 The funding is more than adequate, but the service is not. 
Institutionalized special interests protect the status quo to their benefit at the expense of quality, 
which this paper fears would happen to the healthcare industry under Sanders’s proposal. To 
solve the issue of coverage gaps and general costs, policy makers should be adamantly focused 
on decentralizing the management of health care dollars and grant consumers greater discretion. 
This bill does the exact opposite and demands the nationalization of an industry that employs 
eleven percent of the U.S. workforce. It assumes that central planners can use wide-ranging price 
controls and regulatory efforts to manage the cost and quality of medical services provided to 
over 320 million Americans. Monopsony typically leads to a decrease in services provided as 
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suppliers cannot sustain the buyer’s leverage to fix prices.181 This paper sees no reason to believe 
that the medical industry would be an exception.  
b. The Dog Chasing its Tail is Getting Exhausted 
 Although President Biden’s plan for healthcare reform has yet to be drafted into 
legislation, his campaign website still provides some detail into how he believes America ought 
to deal with concentrated health care markets. His proposal suggests similar state-sponsored 
purchasing as Sanders’s plan, albeit far less expansive and universal. The proposal introduces a 
public insurance option for Americans who seek an alternative from the existing private or 
employer-sponsored marketplace.182 The proposal lacks finite detail such as the cost of 
premiums for beneficiaries and the services that would be covered under the plan.183 However, 
the plan would use the state’s power to negotiate down prices that providers charge.184 Moreover, 
those who qualify for Medicaid in states that have not yet expanded the program under the ACA 
will be automatically opted into the public option, premium free.185 
 The plan also proposes reforming the eligibility standards for those who purchase health 
insurance in the individual marketplace.186 Specifically, the plan eliminates the income eligibility 
threshold for those who qualify for supplemental tax credits under the ACA.187 Under current 
ACA provisions, families who make between 100% to 400% of the federal poverty line qualify 
for subsidies.188 These benchmarks are based on percent of income spent on their insurance 
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premiums.189 Under President Biden’s reforms, subsidy eligibility would be based solely on 
percent of family income spent on health care.190 The threshold would be lowered from 9.86% of 
income to 8.5% of income.191 Therefore, no family will have to spend more than 8.5% of their 
income on health insurance.192  
 This paper disagrees with the public option proposal because of the inevitability that it 
will lead to a single-payer controlled system. If the government can set rates that undercut 
current price levels, that is a benefit to consumers. However, the concern is that this will lead the 
program to become a monopsony like what Senator Sanders has proposed. Jonathan Gruber, the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist who designed the ACA, reported that when 
government insurance expands, six people go off private insurance for every ten people who go 
on public insurance.193 As discussed above, lowering the price of services provided at the 
expense of quality will only create a new set of problems for consumers and the system writ 
large. However, the public option would likely require cost-sharing mechanisms, which would 
limit the perverse effects that the Sanders proposal would entail.  
 Additionally, the plan to extend subsidy eligibility is a metaphorical dog-chasing-tail 
scenario. These broadened eligibility requirements continue to try to catch the runaway costs of 
healthcare as those who purchase insurance on the individual marketplace struggle to afford 
comprehensive coverage. Although it is understandable that the price issue is incredibly difficult 
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problem. It is important to help Americans pay for their health care expenses, but if it happens at 
the expense of taxpayers, this becomes counterintuitive. Unfortunately, these incremental 
reforms mostly preserve a fundamentally broken system. Despite this, President Biden’s plan to 
utilize aggressive antitrust measures to combat concentration in the provider market 194 is a 
welcome development.  
c. Say Their Names: Provider Monopolies are Utilities  
 Avik Roy, former healthcare advisor to both Mitt Romney and Marco Rubio’s 
presidential campaigns, has proposed aggressive measures to tackle the concentrated provider 
market. These reforms would increase supply-side competition and lower prices charged to those 
insured under private insurance plans. The foundation of Roy’s proposal is Medicare Advantage 
for All195, which this paper does not go into in full detail, but will be cited to throughout this 
section. Medicare Advantage for All would evolve the health care system in a direction that 
enables more Americans to choose among a wide variety of insurance plans that suit their needs, 
like how those enrolled in Medicare Advantage can today.196 The plan takes the appealing 
elements of the Biden and Sanders proposals, such as streamlined overhead,197 but decentralizes 
the management of insurance dollars, which is vital to service quality.198 
 To address existing consolidated markets, Roy proposes that the FTC regulate certain 
mega-systems essentially as utilities.199 He suggests that the systems be given two options: 
remain consolidated, but without monopoly pricing power; or voluntarily divest some holdings 
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to restore competition to their hospital market.200 “If a hospital market concentration … region 
exceeds an extremely high threshold … hospitals in that region with >15 percent market share 
would be required to accept rates … that are equal to or less than the median rate paid by a 
Medicare Advantage plan in that region.”201 The proposal suggests that, “These regional 
monopolies or oligopolies would remain free to charge less than Medicare Advantage rates, or to 
engage in value-based insurance contracts with an aggregate spend that remains below Medicare 
Advantage rates.”202 Under the plan, the Medicare Advantage fee benchmark would be phased in 
over a seven-year period.203 If the system chose to divest, they would be required to bring 
hospital market concentration in their region below a certain threshold. 204 
 To prevent further market consolidation, Roy proposes a national all-payer claims 
database (APCD) that delivers full transparency into contracts negotiated between providers and 
insurers.205 This could help aid the FTC, given the resources it would take to review each 
contract for anticompetitive practices. Moreover, according to Roy, “The claims database would 
serve the additional purpose of creating price transparency for private insurers, allowing more 
efficient competition, especially from new entrants and other startups.”206 This would increase 
the leverage of less established insurers as they could better ascertain what certain providers are 
charging their competitors. This APCD structure would be legal under Gobeille v. Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Company, which held that The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
 









1974 (ERISA) preempts state law requiring disclosure of payments relating to health care 
claims.207  
 Next, like President Biden, Roy suggests increased antitrust enforcement to discourage 
further hospital and physician group consolidation. The proposal would quadruple funding for 
the FTC, while restricting that funding to hire hospital industry specialists: “Expanding staffing 
at a government agency may seem like a counterintuitive way to increase market competition, 
but antitrust litigation is an important, and underutilized, tool for combating anticompetitive 
hospital practices.”208 Increased litigation efforts could push courts to review the mistakes made 
in healthcare antitrust cases such as Rockford, which was discussed above. A change in 
healthcare antitrust case law could reverse the consolidation trends the industry has realized 
since the move towards enhanced vertical integration and the incentives given to providers to 
formulate ACOs.  
 Roy also proposes other piecemeal reforms that should prevent further consolidation and 
reverse current trends in the healthcare marketplace. These reforms include repealing regulations 
that create barriers to entry for new providers such as state certificate of need, any willing 
provider, and network adequacy laws.209 These laws require insurers to include in-market 
providers, regardless of the leverage that those providers may have over the insurer.210 
Additionally, the proposal calls for increased usage of telemedicine and medical tourism to 
enable patients to purchase medical services outside of their region. 211 
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d. Empower Consumers to Dilute the Power of the Monopolies  
 Dr. Ryan Neuhofel’s proposal is another consumer driven plan that thwarts market 
centralization while maintaining quality of service. Dr. Neuhofel is a direct primary care 
physician, who provides health care to patients without a third-party insurer.212 Like concierge 
medicine, Dr. Neuhofel charges a monthly membership fee to patients at an average rate of $43 
per member per month.213 This fee covers an array of basic and ancillary services such as labs 
and radiology at wholesale rates.214 If a patient desires an additional service outside of the 
negotiated benefit package, the physician provides it at a cost.215 The model, which Dr. Neuhofel 
refers to as Direct Primary Care (DPC), is a bottom-up approach that he refers to as “a 
metaphorical Costco of primary care.”216 The model reduces administrative overhead and 
eliminates most billing, coding, and regulatory compliance requirements that interfere with 
quality of care while increasing costs. Moreover, it puts a greater onus on general practitioners to 
deliver care for patients, as opposed to our current structure of overreliance on specialists. This 
would reverse the trend of treating primary care providers as essential “referralists”, as Dr. 
Neuhofel puts it.217 Additionally, the model provides transparent pricing for consumers.218  
 To make this reform proposal universal, Dr. Neuhofel proposes public health savings 
accounts for every American that would be supported with government subsidies, if necessary. 
219 Moreover, Dr. Neuhofel proposes a Medicare-for-catastrophic-for-all to cover emergency and 
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catastrophic health care needs.220 This paper does not go into the plan in full but will be cited 
throughout for reference purposes. As discussed earlier, vertical integration has become a talking 
point for provider networks who seek to enhance market leverage. Although some aspects of 
vertical integration have been necessary, other aspects have directly led to increase in prices and 
concentrated markets.221 This proposal would reverse excessive trends of vertical integration and 
would rely on contractual affiliation between providers222, as opposed to direct acquisitions. This 
would temper fears of going back to fragmented health care. Moreover, this structure would 
allow for decentralization of health care dollars, which would weaken the market power of 
existing provider networks. Managed care structures keep money in the hands of central players, 
which inherently raises costs as middlemen such as Pharmacy Benefit Managers get their hands 
in the pot. Our current structure requires third-party payers to pay for services that could be 
provided for cheaper over the counter. This would be as if consumers relied on home insurance 
to pay for new windows and doors. If certain services can be provided without third parties, then 
the system should support it. The DPC model does just this.  
CONCLUSION 
 The conversation surrounding the cost of health care in the United States cannot ignore 
the issue of prices charged for services. As providers have been incentivized to consolidate, their 
leverage has increased. This has had perverse effects on consumers who are insured through 
private plans. Moreover, the absence of assertive antitrust measures and judicial mistakes have 
enabled further consolidation. All of this has led to further concentrated insurance markets as 
well. To reverse these trends, policymakers ought to pursue consumer driven proposals that 
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divest power in the hands of a few monopolies. Avik Roy and Dr. Ryan Neuhofel’s proposals are 
a good place to start to lower the prices of medical services provided in the United States.  
 
 
   
